







Over the past ten years, debates in EU studies around how or why we might consider the EU to be an ethical or normative power have proliferated (Manners 2002, Whitman 2011b). This paper looks less at the issues that might sustain an empirical claim regarding the EU’s moral character, and more at the ‘how’ or meta-ethical questions. That is, how and on which ethical grounds should we evaluate whether the EU is being moral when it acts beyond its borders? At the heart of this question is a prior and necessary debate about how we understand the meaning and content of justice. Where does justice come from? How would we know if it had been attained? My claim in this paper is that answers to these questions in relation to the EU have typically been framed in Kantian terms and that this is hugely problematic if we desire to move beyond the “essentialism” and “neo-colonialism” associated with conceptions of ‘ethical foreign policy’ and ‘civilian power Europe’ respectively (Whitman 2011: 4). 
While the debates in this area have become hugely complicated and extensive, let me be clear from the outset that this paper engages only with the complications that arise with Kantian framings of the ethics of EU foreign policy. This is primarily a meta-ethical and meta-theoretical paper. I do not claim to be an expert in the nitty-gritty of EU foreign relations or in the extensive debates that have emerged in this area. My principal claim is to have spotted an important confusion at the heart of debates in this area which I wish to clarify and correct. Having set out the parameters of this confusion, I wish to argue against Kantian approaches to foreign policy in EU studies and for virtue ethics as a more appropriate set of ethical tools for evaluating EU foreign policy. 
The prevalence of Kantianism in debates around the ethics of EU foreign policy mirrors the prevalence of Kantianism across the wider IR literature. Since the 1970s and the re-emergence of normative or explicitly moral-philosophical approaches to international relations, neo-Kantianism has arguably reigned supreme (see for example, Doyle, 1983; Walzer, 1982; Hurrel, 1990; Nardin, 2006). The hallmark of neo-Kantian positions in IR has been the equation of justice and morality with mutually agreed-upon rules that can bind behaviour and the ethical principles that ought to underpin those rules, which by their moral force, we ought to be compelled to follow them. Justice, it is claimed, is only possible in a politico-legal system in which the freedom of one is the precondition of the freedom of all (Rosen, 1993:6-39) and central to realising this ideal, then, is a system of laws and rules that sets the parameters for freedom. These rules can, it is argued, be deduced rationally either from a priori first principles or maxims, such as ‘impartiality’ or ‘do least harm’ (Barry, 1995, Linklater 2012), or from something that is essential to humans qua humans, such as moral learning and communication (Habermas 1990), or from the structure of rationality itself (Kant 1964, Rawls 1971). But across this approach it is the rules which constitute our freedom and so the purpose of moral philosophy is to provide the foundations for such a claim.​[1]​  
That Kant and later Kantians found the immanent fulfilment of reason and morality in liberal (sometimes social) democratic republicanism is well known. Robert Kagan’s (2002) ironic jibe that the EU is a Kantian ‘paradise’ reflects the widely perceived, if largely unarticulated view that Europe has come closest to the final stage in this providentialist narrative. For many, the universalist aspirations of the EU’s founding principles are what typify this moral force. The assumption seems to be that as the EU grows, develops and extends beyond its borders, that it would then almost automatically have right on its side, simply by virtue of what it is. (Manners 2002) 
This paper takes issue with this way of understanding ethics and the EU. The reasons for this are both political, analytical and normative. We must ask ourselves, is it adequate to conceptualise EU moral agency in Kantian terms when it comes to exercising the use of force beyond its borders or when it seeks to mediate between conflict parties? To assume that by virtue of having devised the norms that the enforcement and extension of them is unproblematic is to reify both the EU and to ignore the very neo-colonialism at the heart of the globalization of the liberal and neo-liberal project. While I do not wish to argue the merits or otherwise of human rights or liberal democratic norms here, what concerns me more is the automatic equation of both with justice and their universalisation with right moral action. On what grounds is it right to assume that such a project is good? This is the question that concerns me here.
What if, as Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) suggested, the very foundations of this neo-Kantian vision are flawed? What if reason or our moral sense are without foundations, our framing of them empirically inaccurate and ultimately undermining of the very project it seeks to realise? What if rule-following is not an adequate foundation for right but rather the tacit acceptance of the status quo, or worse? What if there are alternative ways of understanding the basis of justice, ways that are non-deterministic, sociological and historical? What would this reframing do to our understanding of justice and the EU as an actor and how might we use this reframing of the concept of justice to articulate a new understanding of the ethics of EU foreign policy? 
To this end, this paper seeks to contribute to the debates surrounding ‘the ethical dilemmas’ generated by, and the ‘justifications behind, the exercise of [EU] power’ beyond its borders (Aggestam 2008:3). In order to do so, I take a neo-Aristotelian approach to this subject, informed by the work of Alasdair Macintyre, the key late-twentieth century reference for the re-articulation of Aristotelian ‘virtue ethics’. The paper has both a critical and a constructive part. The critical argument is that neo-Kantian approaches to the ethics of EU foreign policy exclude the social and historical determinants of right in favour of positing rational maxims which are purported to have universal validity. As Kant put it, the maxims that underpin the categorical imperative are a priori or, literally, beyond experience. This approach to the morality of foreign policy is problematic since, as I will show, it leads to the equation of justice to the following of rules and a tendency to see the existing legal architecture as the benchmark of justice. It also elides the socio-historical complexity of world politics. 
Virtue ethics, while a plural field of research in its own right (Crisp 1996), asks us to approach claims to justice and right sociologically and historically. That is to say that claims and competing claims to justice and right must be understood in context as it is this context which gives meaning to right. For example, for virtue ethicists, what it means to be a good father is dependent, to an important degree, on the context within which fathering is to be realised, the practices within which fatherhood is ensconced and the institutions available to defend and sustain those practices. Can we expect the same of a starving father and his family in the Democratic Republic of Congo as we might of his more affluent middle class counterpart in Norway? If the answer is no, then universalism as a basis for ethics is null and void. 
The paper proceeds in the following way. After a critical discussion of Kantian approaches to ethics and foreign policy, I set out in broad terms an alternative way of understanding foreign policy and international relations based on a MacIntyrean understanding of virtue ethics. I will focus on three main insights. First, I will unpack in broad terms the neo-Aristotelian critique of rule-based conceptions of morality, specifically the critique of rationalism; secondly I will show the context-oriented method that virtue ethicists pursue and outline the varieties of context and their causal powers in relation to morality and justice; finally I will set out how these understandings of virtue might translate into empirical studies of foreign policy. 
In the second, more substantial part of the paper, I apply this theoretical discussion to the study of the ethics of EU foreign policy. I begin by providing an all-too-potted analysis of conceptions of justice articulated in the official policy documents of the EU. My aim here is to illustrate the minimalist, formalistic, positive conceptions of justice that are articulated by the EU, conceptions which suggest that for all intents and purposes justice is the rule of law for the EU. I then turn to the growing academic literature within EU studies that has sought to provide grounds for evaluating the EU’s foreign policy behaviour on moral grounds. What I will show is that here too the tendency is towards neo-Kantianism. Here, the academic literature also assumes that the existing laws and universal principles proclaimed by the EU are, a priori, the basis for justice, equating the status quo with a transcendent conception of right. 
What I will show is that in some cases the neo-imperialism/neo-colonialism of this position is clear, and many empirical evaluations of the EU’s normative credentials suggest just this (see for example, Diez and Pace, 2011; Juncos, 2011; Chandler 2004, 2006). Forcing others to abide by laws they have had no hand in writing is hardly a solid foundation for right and presuming the EU to have right on its side by virtue of what it is, is no less hubristic. If, as Whitman, Manners and others argue, Europe and the scholars who have been assessing its ethical credentials, are to avoid charges of neo-colonialism and essentialism, more explicit reflection on this basic problem needs to take place. 

Kantian ethics and EU foreign policy

The Kantian tradition is perhaps the most prolific in twentieth century ethics, and it would be futile to try and summarise it here. Instead, my aim is to set out the meta-ethics of the tradition’s key theorist: Immanuel Kant. By meta-ethics, I mean the underlying theory of Kant’s theory of justice. Rather than focus on the principles of distributive justice or cosmopolitanism, what I want to answer is the following: where does Kantian justice come from, or on what grounds is something just in the Kantian schema? This brief foray is central to our comprehension of the muddle surrounding contemporary thinking about ethics in relation to EU foreign policy, particularly in relation to the concept of Europe as a normative power. But it is also central to understanding precisely what virtue ethics can bring to this debate. 
For Kant, justice and law are interlinked. The law is right when it is the expression of justice, and justice must be the expression of universal or transcendental maxims such as the famous ‘categorical imperative’. But where does the imperative to live life according to universalisable maxims come from? Kant argues that we can deduce the rational architecture of right from the structures of reason itself. Since the faculty of reason is universal (though we are differentially endowed with it), ideas can potentially be shared by all rational humans. Through rational reflection we can all, at least potentially, gain access to the universal principles of justice that can bring political harmony to the world we live in. The onus is on the legislators, since it is they who must set down the rules for those who cannot reason sufficiently well (barbarians, women, children etc). Plumbing the depths of reason ‘will enable him [the jurist] to lay the foundations of all possible positive legislations. And while empirical laws may give him valuable guidance, a purely empirical theory of right […] may have a fine appearance, but will unfortunately contain no brain.’ (Kant, 1991a:132) By this, Kant means that circumstance and context are too fluid and varied. To leave law to respond to this would thus denude it of what gives it human character – reason. Since reason is potentially universal, this is the only true basis for right. 
By this framing, morality is deontological, which is to say it is beyond the phenomenal realm ‘out there’ and is transcendent. Transcendence implies that the principles derived from the structures of pure reason have a universal quality untouched by time and place, because they are common to all men in all places and because we share the possibility of critical reason, even if our abilities are not equally shared (Kant 1993). To let the real, phenomenal world in would not only undermine our ability to reason autonomously, it would also suggest that factors other than reason can shape our conceptions of right and wrong, that we might be pushed and pulled by circumstance and that as individuals we are therefore not always wholly responsible for our actions. For Kant, the universal moral law is as constant as Newton’s physical law, but the two domains are ontologically distinct. In the Groundwork, Kant put it like this: 

pure philosophy (that is, metaphysics) must come first, and without it there can be no moral philosophy at all. Indeed a philosophy which mixes up these pure principles with empirical ones does not deserve the name of philosophy (since philosophy is distinguished from ordinary rational knowledge precisely because it sets forth in a separate science what the latter apprehends only as confused with other things). Still less does it deserve the name of moral philosophy since by this very confusion it undermines even the purity of morals themselves and acts against its own proper purpose (Kant, 1964: 58).

From these assumptions Kant develops his famous categorical imperative. It was stated thus: ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ (Kant 1964:88). In matters of right, law and justice, the categorical imperative translates as: ‘Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right’ (Kant 1991a:133). Thus, justice must first be deduced from the universal maxims of morality, which are themselves given in the structure of reason itself, and from this one must deduce the corresponding laws. In this way, justice becomes synonymous with a deontological or maxim-informed set of laws. 
It is not difficult to see how we move from rule-based maxims of ethics to the moral underpinnings of laws, but the issue for Kant is far more expansive than this. If laws are rational the legal and political system becomes the precondition for bringing human activity into transcendent harmony with itself and the rational laws that govern the universe. So, states become enlightened in so far as they cohere with the principles of political right and international order can only be guaranteed if the republican constitution is spread world-wide, thereby assuring that freedoms secured in one state are not undermined by the pursuit of irrational barbarism by those beyond the federation (Kant 1991c, cf. Behnke 2008) 
Kant’s republican advance on the absolutism of the Old Regime was to replace the identification of the state with an individual, with the identification of the moral state with a set of republican laws (Tuck, 2011). These laws needed the willing agreement and minimal participation of republican political subjects for their moral force, but nonetheless, the state becomes the aggregate of the plural autonomous sovereign individuals. Both individuals and states became bearers of moral agency by virtue of the establishment of republican constitutions. The immediate Hobbesian problem that emerged, of how to ensure that the first order anarchy between individuals in a state of nature was not replicated at the international level between states, was one Kant grappled with throughout his final years. In the ‘Idea of a Universal History’ and ‘Perpetual Peace’, he argues that unfortunately, war will inevitably be the way through which liberal principles are exported to those not yet privy to enlightenment and that through this process of slow expansion of republican constitutionalism throughout the international realm, international relations will be pacified in a manner that mirrored processes underway at the domestic level. 
From this perspective, liberal imperialism was at the heart of the liberal republican project (for more on this, see Jahn, 2000, 2005, 2009). For Fukuyama (1989), ‘the end of history’ was symbolised by the ‘common marketization’ of the world in the EEC’s image. The question we need to ask is whether the ethical framing that underpins this liberal ideology is appropriate for an institution such as the EU, given the legacy of imperialism it is trying to overcome? If the EU wishes to be context specific in its dealings with third party states can or should the EU assume that it has right is on its side or that it is moral by virtue of what it is, simply because quasi and neo-Kantian norms of juridical rectitude are ascribed to it by academics and simply by virtue of the fact that is a nominally republican union? 

Virtue Ethics and International Relations

One way of illustrating the problems with this framing of ethics is to turn to virtue ethics. The existing literature on virtue ethics and IR is minimal (Brown 2010, Mani 2002, Tsakitika 2008, Gaskarth 2010, 2012), but the concerns with rule following as a basis for ethics are shared. Typically, these writers argue, ethical thinking in IR has been framed around questions of the moral efficacy of state borders, that moral thinking in mainstream thinking derives responsibility from law and reason and suggests right moral action is action that is rule-following. There is a general discontent amongst virtue ethicists that context is downplayed in mainstream thinking about ethics and the creeping universalism of moral reason elides the agonistic social basis for morality. While it is impossible to do justice to the sophistication of this literature here, a few words should help show its pertinence in this general context before I briefly develop the meta-ethics of this position in the following section. 
For example, Chris Brown has argued that the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate is both flawed and unhelpful from the perspective of virtue ethics. Brown argued that both cosmopolitans and communitarians presupposed a quasi-liberal and Kantian vision of the individual, an individual who was able to rationally choose between two a priori sets of ethical priorities. The question asked is: should I identify with my community or a global community of rational, rights-bearing individuals? But from the perspective of virtue ethics it is impossible to think about communal or universal moral communities without doing so from the perspective of a community-bound or sociologically specific individual. Some people may wish to identify with a cosmopolis, others not. In short, the communitarian/cosmopolitan debate presents us with a false dichotomy that only makes sense within a generally Kantian framing, one that assumes a universal political subject capable of deciding and labouring under the presupposition that their decision would have universal reach. 
At the turn of the millennium, the tendency within debates surrounding transitional justice was to equate the establishment of the rule of law with the realisation of justice itself. Rama Mani (2002, 2005a, 2005b) asked the following question: if law, including the institutions through which it is delivered and enforced, is the very embodiment of justice, is establishing the rule of law all that is needed to achieve justice in post-conflict societies? Echoing advocates of the liberal peace (see, for example, Doyle 1983, 1986) many suggested that a Kantian peace required republican and liberal democratic institutions and slowly but surely, the ideological content of the liberal world-view was lost as the seemingly irrefutable empirical realities led to moralising US hegemony. In practice, however, Mani argued that a ‘minimalist position’ position was adopted by peace-building agencies. Rather than explicitly endorse the moral credentials of the liberal the rule, law and justice were terms that were used interchangeably and seen to be largely coterminous – indeed, in many cases they still are in popular discourse in the west too (Mani 2002: 26-30). However, this framing provides no analytical or critical purchase on questions of social justice. The equation of law with justice means that issues of distributive and social justice were redressed through the courts in post-conflict contexts. This undermined the social practices needed to sustain recovery in the long term by arrogating to the courts (usually imposed by the west from the outside) the right to decide and to legislate, with now well-known consequences (see for example, Paris 2004, Sriram 2007, Richmond 2006). 
While the adoption of the aquis communitaire is nominally voluntary, the process of EU enlargement is, while technocratic (Kurki 2011), hardly an a-political process and irrespective of the principles the EU might claim to uphold, it routinely contravenes and undermines these principles in the pursuit of its interests. For example, the EU’s failure to defend the outcomes of the Palestinan elections in 2006, or by establishing the High Representative for the former Yugoslavia thereby undermining democracy in Bosnia, are also cases in point here. (see, Pace 2007, Chandler 2004, 2006; Juncos, 2011 and forthcoming) The point is that valorising the EU’s own principles and defending what it is is hardly a basis for determining moral rectitude. Moreover, often the law acts as a defence for injustice or as a means for absolving and shirking responsibility. Myrto Tsakatika (2008) has turned her focus to the corruption scandal that rocked and eventually forced the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999. Following rules in this case was clearly inadequate since the rules and laws were set down by those who circumnavigated them. Rather than establish ever more rules, Tsakatika suggests that a more fruitful place to start might be to foster those virtues of responsibility and accountability, that were lacking in this instance, amongst EU technocrats. This ‘internal’ analysis of the EU from a virtue ethics perspective is crying out for an ‘external’ companion piece. 
There is some precedent here for the study of foreign policy from a virtue ethics perspective, but it is a little individualist in focus. Jamie Gaskarth (2010) has sought to revive thinking about virtues in order to provide a system of ethical critique that focuses on the character of individual foreign policy makers. His turn to character allows him to avoid the tendency to evaluate the decisions of foreign policy makers according to rules, which themselves need ethical justification (and so on in infinite regress) and rarely seem to constrain agency or dissuade actors from providing non-legal virtue-based justifications for their actions – Tony Blair being the focal point of Gaskarth’s piece. Gaskarth argues that FPA might be profitably developed by setting out the appropriate character traits decision makers ought to cultivate if they are to be able to exercise good moral judgement in specific international contexts, for it seems that this, rather than rules, seems to be the criteria by which people usually justify and evaluate actions. 
What I want to do next is develop these openings in order to flesh out how the work of MacIntyre can help us approach EU foreign policy. To this end, three inter-related concepts are central: virtues, practices and institutions. Practices are, 

any coherent and complex form of socially embedded established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. (MacIntyre 1981: 175)

Practices can involve building cities, playing chess or football, or writing an academic paper. Within these practices, the virtues indicate socially agreed standards of excellence towards which those who aspire to excellence will gear their activities. MacIntyre defines the virtues as ‘an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods’ (1981: 178).
For MacIntyre, society is structured through practices and morality is central to shaping the way we act within those practices. Indeed, what is moral does not travel well outside those practices. This is not to claim that virtue ethicists are communitarians, valorising a community over a cosmopolis, just that when we compare and debate the virtues, we must be sensitive to the contexts within which practices are ensconced. The virtues are moral in the sense that they lead us to aspire to ‘the good’ (as opposed to material goods) and provide reasons for avoiding vices, not because they chime with the subterranean beat of human consciousness evolving to an ever higher rationality in some dim and distant future. Vices, on the other hand, will be those conscious activities, like plagiarism, that systematically undermine the practices within which the virtues, like scholarly integrity, are given meaning and are realised. Both practices and virtues are therefore co-dependent. From this perspective, MacIntyre argues that ‘it is not clear to me […] how any adequate philosophical analysis in this area [of morality] could escape being also a sociological hypothesis, and vice versa’. (MacIntyre, 1981: 70) 
MacIntyre develops a Marxist-inspired understanding of the role of class in shaping the social and political context within which certain virtues are promoted and defended (for more see Blackledge 2008). What does this involve? If I desire such and such, working to attain that desired object will constitute the telos of my actions. My means and the values I embody in pursuing that end, are integral to and prefigure the ends themselves. Since we are all constrained by our class position (not to mention race, gender and geographic location) to some degree, the goods we defend and aspire to are inevitably socially structured as are our conceptions of them. There are no transcendent goods or values and none can be universalised.  So, MacIntyre sees our moral telos to be relatively structured within the practices and institutions we inhabit. This leaves open the question of progress, of the nature of rationality and of the sorts of institutions we might wish to build and does not deny that we inevitably have competing visions of the good. Finally, virtue ethics does not valorise the law and suggests we see the law as much as the expression of power as of the expression of right (cf. Anghie 2005).  
MacIntyre’s views on institutions would also council against reifying or moralising them.  While he argues that practices and virtues without institutions to defend them would be fatally vulnerable, there is no natural synergy between an institution or set of institutions and the virtues and practices a population hold dear. Institutions, from football clubs to the EU, are ‘characteristically and necessarily concerned with […] external goods. They are involved in acquiring money and other material goods; they are structured in terms of power and status, and they distribute money, power and status as rewards’. They do this to sustain themselves and ‘the practices of which they are the bearers’ (MacIntyre, 1981: 181). Unlike the ideology of the moral state we find in Kantian and liberal ideology, for MacIntyre there is no necessary synergy between virtues and institutions or between individuals and institutions. Simply put, institutions are not agents, but structures within which agents act (Wight, 2006). Institutions constrain and enable individual and group agency in differential ways depending on the subject position of the individual group within that institution and the positioning of groups and individuals relative to one another (are groups and individuals dominated, enabled by others, do they occupy privileged positions, are they materially better off?). Part of the problem with contemporary accounts of the EU’s moral agency is precisely this – it is considered to have one. This is a simple act of reification, even fetishism. As I argued above, it was the nineteen-century liberal republicans who did most to cast the state as a moral person, the equivalent of the rational universal moral political subject that was necessary to undergird the law. This monistic ideology of political agency infuses our political ontology today such that it makes evaluating the EU’s behaviour very difficult indeed. As the multi-level governance literature (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996) suggests, not to mention the declaiming voices that surrounded the EU’s lack of coherence and effectiveness in Bosnia over the last two decades (Juncos, forthcoming), the EU is at best a constellation of institutions that rarely if ever allow individuals and groups to pull in the same way. A far more fruitful focus for moral judgement is individuals, groups and the institutional context within which they operate. This reframing demands that we avoid the reification of the EU and refuse the simple and deceptive equation of EU agency with moral agency. 

Conceptions of justice in the formal EU documentation

So, how do the formal EU documents frame questions of justice? ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ makes reference to any number of virtues that contemporary Europeans hold dear, from ‘human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity’ (Preamble) to ‘non-discrimination’ (Article 21), to an entire section devoted to ‘Solidarity’ (Title IV), however, when it comes to ‘Justice’ (Title VI) the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is quite clear that what is meant is simply the rule of law and due process (European Commission, 2010), a paradigm case of ‘minimalism’ in the sense outlined by Rama Mani (above). The European Commission document ‘Underwriting Justice for All’ (European Commission 2009) states that its aim is to ensure that justice is ‘accessible to all’. ‘EU support in this area deals with judiciary, courts and prisons.’ Also, ‘transitional justice’ refers to ‘post-conflict situations [wherein] justice is often part of security sector reform approach.’ When we look at what it means for the EU to be an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, what the relevant EU documents refer to is upholding the rule of law under the first and third pillar of the community. When we turn to the Lisbon Treaty, we see that justice is also predominantly defined in this juridical sense, referring either to the Court of Justice, and ‘access to justice’ or the ‘Area of Freedom Security and Justice’. In the European Commission’s publicity document Freedom, security and justice for all: Justice and home affairs in the European Union justice is either undefined or conflated with ‘development of effective justice systems across the world’ (European Commission, 2004:4). Legal justice, criminal justice and justice systems are more or less the limit of formal EU conceptions of justice.
Sometimes, however, the EU documents hint at wider conceptions of justice. For example, Article 3 of the Treaty of the EU refers in passing to ‘social justice’: ‘The Union shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.’ Elsewhere, the European Security Strategy states that ‘[f]lows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice’ (European Council 2003: Section 1 emphasis added). In neither instance is the concept of justice defined precisely and the problem that attends to this is clear. Can global trade regulations be both legal and unjust at once? Is the pursuit of social justice compatible with the existing legal architecture of the global order? How could we know if the laws are unjust and what are the problems we face in attempting to craft a vocabulary of injustice and a practice of justice-seeking if the very things we are asked to see as the manifestation of justice are those things which patently are not so. However, such a lexicon and normative framework cannot be found within EU documents, where ‘minimalist’ accounts of justice predominate. 
Turning to the EU’s emerging practices of ‘transitional justice’, Crossley-Frolick (2009) has unpicked the EU’s implicit and emerging strategy from the tangled web of policy instruments and institutions currently being developed. Of particular interest are the EU’s moves towards prosecuting human rights violations, democracy promotion, promoting the rule of law and development, all through the Commission and its right of initiative. The defence of these practices is based on global legal convention. This is not in and of itself unethical or immoral, but it does suggest that the EU has conflated what is right with what is legal.  Elsewhere, the European Security Strategy makes clear that, 

The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order (European Council 2003:10).

This position is defended by most liberal states and is usually accompanied by market reforms and privatisation. However, there is little reflection in the policy documents as to why this model of justice is preferred over any other. Are we to concede the neo-liberal argument that a nominal liberal peace provides a template to end history? 
If we turn to the academic literature it tends not to depart substantively from this general neo-Kantian framing. Ian Manners described justice as ‘a particular/culture transcending norm’ (2006:170). Elsewhere, Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007: 453) have argued that ‘European elites and officials represent the EU as strongly committed to international law and therefore as a major sponsor of justice and order in international relations.’ Federica Bicci argues that ‘the normative core’ of such values as ‘social justice’, as referred to in various sections of the Treaty of Europe, are ‘defined on the basis of the universality of values’ embedded in international law and the various UN declarations (Bicci 2006:292). Erik Eriksen, in discussing the cosmopolitan nature of the EU as a polity, refers to a ‘sense of justice’ as one where actors ‘subject their actions to the constraints of a higher ranking law’ out of a sense of duty and obligation to it. He continued that ‘[i]n order to ensure justice at the world level, or at least to be able to sanction norm breaches such as human rights violations and crimes against humanity, there is a need for a system that lays down the law, equally binding on all.’ (Eriksen, 2006: 253) He continued: ‘unlike what is often believed, [this approach to law] implies the need for coercive means because only with the threat of sanctions can the law compel compliance.’ (Eriksen 2006: 252) The presupposition here of course is that international law defined in this way has the universal moral robustness to legitimize such coercion and the EU has right on its side when it compels such compliance by virtue of what it is. Eriksen continues: ‘I suggest as a criterion of a legitimate foreign policy that the EU does not aspire to become a world organization – a world state – but subscribes to the principles of human rights, democracy and rule of law also for dealing with international affairs, hence underscoring the cosmopolitan law of the people.’ Quoting from Tony Honoré, Eriksen continues that ‘[e]ven angels need “a system of laws in order to know the right thing to do”’. (Eriksen, 2006: 256)  That this law of the people was devised in Europe and is exported by Europeans seems not to matter. Finally, this equation of right with the rule of law epitomises the neo-colonial nature of liberal equation of right with the rule of law. 
Elsewhere, references to justice in the academic literature on the EU as an ethical actor tend to fall back on the EU’s declaration that social justice is at the heart of its policy and, as in the EU documentation, the concept tends to be alluded to only to be left undefined (see for example, Manners 2002: 241, Aggestam and Hill 2008: 102, Lerch and Schwellnus 2006:315, 316). Even arch realists are not uncomfortable with using the term, but defining justice seems to elicit less enthusiasm. Adrian Hyde-Price for example, (2008: 36) has argued that even a calculating and rational EU should not ‘remain indifferent to gross human rights violations, international aggression or shocking manifestations of social and economic injustice.’ But how would we know an instance of economic injustice when we see one? Do we revert to legal benchmarking or a sense of moral indignation? As the contemporary European fiscal crisis has shown, there were very few laws broken in the original collapse, but the injustices felt by the populations of Greece and elsewhere are innumerable. Is it right that technocrats be appointed by the EU to govern Italy and Greece? Is violent protest legitimately criminalised? 
More worryingly, the neo-Kantianism expressed in EU foreign policy is also implicitly and sometimes explicitly neo-colonial. Where classical imperialism involved the control of territories at a distance, and Marxist-Leninist theories saw imperialism as economically driven, neo-Kantian imperialism is juridical (Anghie 2005). The extension of the regimes of international law, through such institutions as sovereignty, protectorates, colonial administration and so forth was structurally iniquitous and can hardly be equated with justice. The consequence today is that the structural barriers preventing most from being the architects of their own legal institutions are formidable, but those preventing popular control of global legal frameworks are simply out of sight. From the adoption of the aquis communitaire to the negotiation of the Common Agricultural Policy at the WTO, it is elite rather than popular participation which shapes the global institutional architecture and the virtues that come to shape global order are those promoted by these very same elites. Equating justice with the rule of law disempowers those who would articulate protest in the language of social justice by criminalising them as rule-breakers. The problem with critical accounts of EU foreign policy, those accounts that seek to evaluate the EU’s actions beyond its borders is that they have ceded the debate around questions of justice to the neo-Kantians. In the following section I focus more explicitly on the work of Ian Manners to illustrate this point in more detail. 
 
Virtue Ethics and EU Foreign Policy

My aim in this final section is twofold. First, I wish to use virtue ethics as a analytical framework to dissect and critique perhaps the dominant account of the EU as a normative power. Secondly, I wish to use this account to set out a more effective means of evaluating the EU’s foreign policy. My focus is the work of Ian Manners. It is my claim that in spite of concerted attempts by Manners to move beyond the implicit ‘neo-colonialism’ of Duchene’s ‘civilian power Europe’ and the purported ‘essentialism’ of theories of ethical foreign policy (Whitman, 2011: 4), by ultimately defending a neo-Kantian theory of justice, Manners repeats both flaws and reifies the EU. 
Manners argued that the EU’s normative power derived from its ability to persuade third party and accession countries to accept its norms of behaviour through ‘ideational’ rather than ‘material’ means – through accepting the EU as a model of behaviour rather than have the EU dictate behaviour by force. Surveying the evolution of the EU and the adoption of the aquis by accession states, as well as the successful campaign against the death penalty worldwide, Manners concluded that ‘[t]he EU has gone further towards making its external relations informed by, and conditional on, a catalogue of norms’ (Manners, 2002: 241) and that these norms are both liberal and contagious. The sorts of norms Manners discussed were the principles of liberty, human rights, the rule of law, inclusive democracy, social solidarity and sustainable development, all principles set out by the EU in the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms. (Manners, 2002: 242). From this set of observations Manners argued for a conception of the EU as a ‘normative power’ and defined it thus: 

The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics. It is built on the crucial, and usually overlooked observation that the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is. (Manners, 2002: 252)

However, as critics have shown, not only is it unclear what the EU is, even by Manners’ criteria, but being a norm entrepreneur is hardly unique to the EU. For example, Thomas Diez (2005) argued that Manners’ framing of the concept of ‘normative’ specifies little that is unique to the EU and can equally be used to describe the United States, a state which Manners understands to be a quintessential ‘hard power’ in world politics. But why are the norms the EU promotes of any moral value? To answer this question Manners needed a theory of ethics that was largely absent in wider discussions of the subject. Typically, as the above discussion has sought to show, the meta-ethics of these debates are implicitly or explicitly Kantian and Manners is no exception. (Manners 2008a, 2008b). 
Manners’ aim in this second stage of his analysis was to move away from descriptive analysis to ‘focus […] on the ways in which we might judge the normative ethics of the EU in world politics by critically discussing the principles that it seeks to promote, the practices through which it promotes them, and the impact they have’ (Manners 2008a: 45). His aim is not to provide new ethical underpinnings for EU normative power, but to use ethics as formalised systems of moral philosophy to evaluate and assess EU behaviour. Manners distinguishes between virtue ethics, deontology and consequentialism, or ‘living by example’, ‘being reasonable’ and ‘doing least harm’ respectively (Manners 2008a: 59).  Here ethics, the branch of moral philosophy that formalises ‘the study of the concepts involved in practical reasoning: good, right, duty, obligation, virtue, freedom, rationality, choice’, (Blackburn 1996: 126), is used as descriptive and evaluative taxonomy. In short, Manners suggests that deontology, virtue ethics and consequentialism can each be used to help us ‘judge’ the EU’s ‘principles, actions and impact’, arguing that ‘we must judge the EU’s creative efforts to promote a more just, cosmopolitical world in terms of its principles, actions and impact’ (Manners, 2008a: 47). The future, it seems, is given, what needs evaluating is the way in which the EU seeks to bring it about. 
The problem is that by arguing that maxims are the means through which this evaluation must take place that not only is the measuring instrument Kantian, but so are the ‘cosmopolital’ results Manners wishes to realise. What is also quite striking here is how Manners transforms each of these quite irreconcilable systems of ethics into Kantian, deontological maxims. Manners argues that deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics each ‘provide the EU with maxims which should shape the EU’s normative power in world politics’ (Manners 2008a: 47 emphasis added). Surely only Kantian deontologists would subscribe to such a position, because only deontologists subscribe to the idea that moral maxims (that can be embedded in law) can or should guide behaviour at all. It is also symptomatic of a wider confusion that Manners also claims that Elizabeth Anscombe, the progenitor of modern-day virtue ethics, is the progenitor of consequentialism, a term she in fact coined to describe a system of ethics she thought fundamentally unsuited to politics (Manners 2008a:58, cf Anscombe 1958). 
What are the analytical and practical implications of all of this? First, for the EU, justice is equated with law. This is problematic, particularly if one were to try and develop and account of the injustice of EU law. Secondly, with few academics moving this debate away from the EU’s general framing, it seems the EU-watchers are working within the same liberal ideological parameters. From this perspective everything looks Kantian – problems and solutions alike. This is problematic since if the EU and scholars of the EU wish to achieve ends that are not neo-colonial and nor do we wish to reify or essentialise the EU, then a change in the tenor of the debate is necessary. Thirdly, and related to this, despite being favourably disposed towards virtue ethics, Manners’ analysis ends up taking us back to neo-Kantianism and is unhelpful in moving this debate forward in a substantive way. Not only is the EU essentialised and given its own irreversible telos, but so to the cosmopolitical project it heralds is arguably neo-colonial. There is an alternative and it should, by now, be coming into view. It is not the law, but the virtues the EU espouses that should form the benchmark against which EU agents can and ought to be evaluated.  

Conclusion: The virtues of virtue ethics for the study of EU foreign policy

Four things need to be borne in mind. From the perspective on virtue ethics developed here, institutions cannot be expected to be virtuous, only individuals can. Secondly, justice as a virtue is far more expansive than the realisation of the rule of law. Third, there are no transcendent virtues, only practice-virtues that are embedded and realised in time and space, by individuals and the groups they form and through institutions that often, if not always, undermine them. Fourth, I have argued that Kantian or neo-Kantian approaches to ethics tend towards a neo-colonial politics. I have argued that the equation of right with rule following also tends to absolve responsibility and reifies the law. MacIntyre’s approach to virtue ethics provides a valuable alternative to help us rethink ethics in this context. MacIntyre argues that virtues and practices are mutually sustaining, that institutions routinely undermine the virtues upheld by groups and individuals and that no moral claim is therefore independent of its sociological and historical context. It is this vital final point that is of most importance to the study of EU foreign policy. It is not that as Eriksen would have it, we need the law so as to know what to do, but rather that we should have confidence in our stock of moral learning and take succour from our individual contexts. All moral beliefs are beliefs from a particular position and the virtue ethics approach provides a framework and language for defending non-rule-based accounts of ethics. 
	From MacIntyre’s perspective, the EU as an institution can be expected to consistently contradict the moral and ethical standards it upholds. Secondly, however, we cannot hold ‘the EU’ to account, but must, rather, hold key individuals and groups to account in their respective roles and within the practices they defend, while judging them according to the virtues they proclaim, and also those which we bring to bear anew. As institutions develop in time, we should not be surprised that the EU, a technocratic institution at its core, is struggling to realise the virtues of democracy and social justice. Finally, we cannot assume that the principles the EU promotes are or are potentially universal. If, as it has been argued here, all moral claims are claims that are in reality sociologically and historically contingent, universalist claims are implicitly or explicitly neo-colonial. So, for example, one does not have to be a realist to heed E.H. Carr’s calls for circumspection when we hear claims that the EU is promoting universal values of freedom and peace, since these claims are not unconnected to the EU’s attempts to assert itself in the world, nor are these projects unconnected to the historical legacy of colonialism which has prepared the world for liberal values by making the world in the EU’s own image.  For Francis Fukuyama (1989) the ‘common-marketisation’ of the world in the EEC’s image constituted ‘the end of history’. What does this say to alternative visions of the future, when liberal visions of world politics are taken for granted and the means by which we might assess them are said to lie in an internal assessment of the EU’s ability to align with its own principles. This would make the EU judge and jury in its own trial and we would simply be holding liberalism to account on its own terms. This is manifestly only part of a solution at best. Ian Manners puts it like this: 	 
The creative efforts and longer-term vision of EU normative power towards
the achievement of a more just, cosmopolitical world which empowers people
in the actual conditions of their lives should and must be based on more universally accepted values and principles that can be explained to both Europeans and non-European alike. (Manners, 2008:60)

There is no question that the empowerment of individuals and groups “in the actual conditions of their lives” is of singular political importance today. But, from this perspective no such “universal accepted values and principles” exist, nor does the export of such and such values from the technocratic or intellectual heart of Europe “to Europeans and non-Europeans alike” constitute anything more than neo-colonialism. As there are no transcendent grounds for adjudicating between the virtues, tolerance and humility become the supreme virtues when dealing with ‘outsiders’, and hubris the supreme vice. 
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^1	  This approach is quite distinct from a system of ethics that derives ‘the good’ from the degree to which actions contribute to aggregate happiness, or a relativist position that sees no transcendent grounds on which to build moral claims. Consequentialism does not feature in this paper in any meaningful way, but will be left for a separate treatment. While there is an extensive literature on the so-called ‘logic of consequences’ (e.g., March and Olsen, 1989), there is little in this literature that is concerned with consequentialism and utilitarianism as a grounding for ethics. Rather it is more generally used as an explanatory tool for identifying an ideal type of rational agency, one juxtaposed with a ‘logic of appropriateness’ – action consciously or unconsciously related to rule-following. In both instances the ‘normative’ is stripped down to a level consistent with contemporary social scientific standards of objectivity and the prior meta-ethical discussions as to the morality of rule following or of consequences as a criterion for right is elided. Using these two logics as explanatory tools is another example of a problem I will identify here, but my focus will be on Kantian and neo-Kantian though. 
